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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order Denying the Appellant's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Order Regarding all Pending Motions, and Judgment, file-stamped in 
the above-entitled matter on the 10th day of August, 2012, the 11 ih day of July, 2012, and 
the 28th day of September, 2012, respectively. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about August 3, 2006, Appellant, Wally Kay Schultz, (hereinafter referred 
to as "Schultz"), was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, as is set forth in 
Case No. CR-2006-2718, in the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Minidoka. Said case was set for trial at a later date, which was vacated 
because of a guilty plea entered by Schultz on or about June 4, 2007. 
Schultz was later sentenced on August 13, 2007, to a unified sentence of five (5) 
years, which unified sentence was comprised of a mimmum (fixed) period of confinement 
of five ( 5) years, followed by an indeterminate period of custody of 0 years. Schultz 
received credit for time served in the amount of 3 76 days. (R. pp. 118-124.) 
Subsequent to the above proceedings, on or about June 16, 2011, Schultz received 
from the Offices of the State Appellate Public Defender a letter, including copies of four 
Memoranda sent out by the Idaho State Police, which indicate that as early as 2003, 
certain improprieties occurred in at one of the State's forensic laboratories. (R. pp. 
9-15.) One of the Memoranda indicated that on February 24, 2011, ISP Captain Clark 
- l -
Rollins received an Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report from ISP Lab 
Improvement Manager, i\fatthew Garnette, regarding Skyler Anderson. Garnette 
evidently alleged that Mr. Anderson maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of 
controlled substances and other chemicals for display purposes, outside the practices of 
the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking and auditing. 
During yearly audits of the Region V lab facility, Mr. Anderson and others intentionally 
hid the unauthorized "display drugs" and other chemicals from auditors to avoid detection 
of this practice. Mr. Anderson personally hid the drugs from auditors on at least four ( 4) 
occasions. (R. p. 138.) 
Based on this information, Schultz filed a Petition, Affidavit for Post Conviction 
Relief and Motion and Affidavit in Support of Appointment of Counsel, on or about the 
2nJ day of August, 2011, alleging, among other things, that there existed newly discovered 
evidence that would justify post conviction relief in this matter. ( R. p. 1-25.) 
The State ofidaho, by and through its attorney, Lance D. Stevenson, filed an 
Answer on or about August 17, 2011. (R. pp. 26-29.) The Court issued an Order 
Appointing Public Defender on or about August 29, 2011. (R. p. 30.) 
On or about September l 4, 2011, the State filed a Motion for summary Dismissal 
of Post-Conviction Petition and Brief in Support. (R. pp. 31-41.) Schultz filed an 
Objection to State's Answer on or about September 21, 2011. (R. pp. 42-29.) On or 
about September 23, 2011, the Court issued a Scheduling Order Regarding S tatc' s 
Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R. pp. 46-46.) 
Schultz filed a Motion to Vacate Underlying Criminal Conviction and Sentence 
,.... 
L -
on or about September 28, 2011, and accompanying Affidavit of Counsel. (R. pp. 47-58.) 
The State filed an Objection to Motion to Vacate Underlying Criminal Conviction and 
Sentence on or about October 4, 2011. (R. pp. 59-61.) The State then filed an Objection 
to Motion to Amend Successive Post-Conviction Brief on or about October 26, 20 l l. (R. 
pp. 62-()5.) 
A hearing was conducted on or about December 19, 2011, wherein counsel for 
Schultz, Clayne Zollinger, was allowed to withdraw as attorney of record (R. p. 66 ), and 
an Order Permitting Attorney to Withdraw was issued by the Court on or about December 
19, 2011. (R. pp. 67-68.) An Order Appointing Public Defender was entered by the Court 
on December 22, 2011, appointing Darnel S. Brown and Fuller Law Offices as attorneys 
for Schultz. (R. p. 69.) 
On or about January 20, 2012, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to State's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal was filed. (R. pp. 70-88.) Schultz filed Petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Disposition on or about January 23, 2012. (R. pp. 90-91.) A 
hearing was held on January 23, 2012, and Schultz was granted an additional thirty days 
to file an amended petition. (R. pp 89, 92-93.) 
Schultz filed an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief and Petitioner's 
Amended Memorandum m Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on or 
about February 21, 201 (R. pp. 94-157.) On or about February 22, 2012, Schultz filed 
a Motion for an Order Determining that this Matter Proceed as a Class Action. (R. pp. 
158-160.) 
State filed an Answer to Amended Post Conviction Application on or about 
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March 8, 2012. (R. pp. 161-163.) The State filed an Objection to Motion to Determine 
that Matter Proceed as a Class Action and Motion to Dismiss on or about March 26, 
2012. (R. pp. 164-176.) 
On or about March 28, 2012, the State filed an Answer to Amended Successive 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (R. pp. 177-179.) 
On or about June 19, 2012, the State filed an Affidavit of Matthew Garnette. (R. 
pp. 181-183.) 
Schultz filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Continue on or about the 2211d day of June, 
2012 (R. pp. 186-188) which was denied by the Court in an Order Denying Ex-Parte 
Motion to Continue dated on or about June 22, 2012. (R. pp. 189-190.) 
A hearing was conducted on or about June 25, 2012, relative to all pending 
motions, and Exhibit A and Office of Professional Standards Administrative Investigation 
Packet as Exhibit B were introduced as evidence. (R. pp 191-192.) 
That the Court issued an Order Regarding All Pending Motions and Judgment of 
Dismissal on or about the 11th day of July, 2012. (R. pp. 194-204.) On or about July 25, 
2012, Schultz filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 205-213.) The State filed an 
Objection to Motion for Reconsideration on or about August 7, 2012. (R. pp. 214-216.) 
On or about the l 0th day of August, 2012, the Court entered an Order Denying the 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. (R. pp. 217-224.) 
Schultz filed a Notice of Appeal on or about the 20th day of September, 2012. ( R. 
pp. .) The [daho Supreme Court issued an Order Remanding to District Court on 
or about the 24th day of September, 2012. (R. p. 228.) The Court issued a Judgment on 
- 4 -
or about the 28th day of September, 2012. (R. p. 229.) Schultz then filed an Amended 
Notice of Appeal on or about October 5, 2012. (R. pp. 230-233.) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On or about August 3, 2006, Schultz was charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, as is set forth in Case No. CR-2006-2718, in the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka. Said case was set for trial at a later 
date, which was vacated because of a guilty plea entered by Schultz on or about June 4, 
2007. Schultz was persuaded to change his not-guilty plea to guilty as a result of plea 
negotiations. Schultz' decision to change his plea was based partially on evidence which 
was to be presented at trial, specifically, testimony by forensic scientist, Skyler D. 
Anderson, relative to a lab report indicating that the controlled substance Schultz was 
accused of being in possession of was methamphetamine. See a true and correct copy of 
the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Crimmalistic Analysis Report Controlled 
Substance Analysis and Affidavit ( R. pp. 130- l 3 l, 135-136) and the State's Supplemental 
Witness List (R. pp. 133-134.) Schultz was later sentenced on August 13, 2007, to a 
unified sentence of five (5) years, which unified sentence was comprised of a minimum 
(fixed) period of confinement of five (5) years, followed by an indeterminate period of 
custody of 0 years. Schultz received credit for time served in the amount of 37() days. 
(R. pp. 118-1 
Subsequent to the above proceedings, on or about June 16, 2011, Schultz received 
from the Offices of the State Appellate Public Defender a letter, including copies of four 
Memoranda sent out by the Idaho State Police, which indicate that as early as 2003, 
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certain improprieties occurred in at least one of the State's forensic laboratories. (R. pp. 
9-15.) One of the Memoranda indicated that on February 24, 2011, ISP Captain Clark 
Rollins received an Idaho State Police Administrative Incident Report from ISP Lab 
Improvement Manager, Matthew Garnette, regarding Skyler Anderson. Garnette 
evidently alleged that Mr. Anderson maintained an ongoing unauthorized quantity of 
controlled substances and other chemicals for display purposes, outside the practices of 
the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking and auditing. 
During yearly audits of the Region V lab facility, Mr. Anderson and others intentionally 
hid the unauthorized "display drugs" and other chemicals from auditors to avoid detection 
of this practice. Mr. Anderson personally hid the drugs from auditors on at least four ( 4) 
occasions. (R. p. 138.) (Please refer to the Idaho State Police Office of Professional 
Standards Administrative Investigation Report, OPS Case Number OP 2011-003, pages 1 
through 19 contained in Exhibit "B''.) 
Based on this information, Schultz filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post 
Conviction Relief on or about the 211J day of August, 2011, alleging, among other things, 
that there existed newly discovered evidence that would justify post conviction relief in 
this matter. (R. pp. 1-25.) 
It is Schultz's position that because of the actions of the above-described 
employees and the lab report provided by said laboratory m this case, he was prohibited 
from utilizing a defense in his case that might otherwise be available to him. Specifically, 
Schultz was prohibited from engaging m appropriate cross-examination of Skyler 
Anderson concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and 
- 6 -
procedures in order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for 
truthfulness, all in violation of Schultz' Sixth Amendment Constitutional Right to 
confront all of witnesses against him. 
In addition, it is Schultz' position that the information obtained from the Idaho 
State Police is exculpatory in nature due to the fact that the in formation could be used to 
impeach Skylar Anderson to such an extent that his analysis of the controlled substance 
would not be accepted in the scientific community. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
( 1) Whether or not the District Court erred in dismissing Schultz' Post 
Conviction Petition. 




(1) ·whether or not the District Court erred in dismissing Schultz' 
Post Conviction Petition. 
First of all, there is no doubt that information that was favorable to the defense 
was withheld and suppressed (whether inadvertently or not), thereby creating a 
Brady/Giglio scenario. In this regard, consideration of the law set-out in S. v. Kohring, 
637 F.3d 895 (91h Cir. 201 l) is particularly relevant to the circumstances in the instant 
case. In the Kohring case, Kohring was tried and convicted of Conspiracy to Commit 
Extortion, Attempted Extortion, and Bribery, based largely upon the testimony of a 
witness who had testified against him at trial. After conviction, and through post 
conviction procedures, it was discovered that certain evidence concerning sexual 
misconduct on the part of the witness had been withheld. In subsequent proceedings, this 
information was determined to be relevant, particularly with respect to his characterfor 
truthfitlness. [emphasis added.] The Court in its analysis stated the following: 
In Brady, the Supreme Comt held "the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1994. 
In Giglio, the Supreme Court extended this principle to include evidence 
that impeaches a witness's credibility. 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763. 
There are three elements of a Brcu(y/Giglio violation: "(l) the evidence at 
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or 
because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by 
the State, either wilfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have 
ensued." United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1887, 1202 (91h Cir. 2008) 
(quoting v. 527 U.S. 263, 281 119 S.Ct. 1936, I 
L.Ed.2d 286 ( 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Evidence is prejudicial or material '"only if there is a reasonable 
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probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagiev, 
473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). There 1s a 
"reasonable probability" of prejudice when suppression of evidence 
"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'' Kyles v. Whitle.v, 514 
U.S.419,434, 115S.Ct.1555, 131 L.Ed.2d490(1995)(citingBagley, 
473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). But a ''reasonable probability" may be 
found "even where the remaining evidence would have been sufficient to 
convict the defendant." Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1071 (citing Strickler, 527 
U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 ). 
Suppressed evidence is considered ''collectively, not item by item." Kr/es, 
514 U.S. At 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. If a reviewing court finds a material 
Brmzv!Giglio violation, "there is no need for further harmless-error 
review." Id. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. But if suppressed evidence is 
"merely cumulative," then the failure to disclose is not a violation. Morris 
v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 (9[11 Cir. 2006). 
[emphasis added.] 
Of course, Schultz realizes that while Brady certainly applies under the 
circumstances described above, it is also necessary for Schultz to show materiality. The 
law in this regard is sufficiently set out in In Re Brown, l 7 Cal.4th 873 ( 1998), wherein 
the Court states as follows: 
The current standard of review for Brady materiality was first aiiiculated 
in Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. 667, although the United States Supreme Court 
began developing it in earlier decisions. (See Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 
112 [96 S.Ct. At pp. 2401-2402]; Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. 
atp. 154 [92 S.Ct. Atp. 766].) Recentlyin/\)·/es, supra, 514 U.S. 419, 
the Court reemphasized four aspects articulated in Bagley critical to proper 
analysis of Brady error. First, "[a]lthough the constitutional duty is 
triggered by the potential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence, a 
showmg of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance 
that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately 
in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable 
doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate 
the defendant). [Citations.] Bagley 's touchstone of materiality is a 
"reasonable probability' of a different result, and the adjective is 
important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely 
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than not have received a different verdict \Vith the evidence, but whether in 
its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting 111 a 
verdict worthy of confidence." (Id. at p. 434 [ 115 S.Ct. At pp. l 5(>5-
1566].) 
Second, ·•it is not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not 
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the 
undisclosed evidence, there \vould not have been enough left to convict. 
The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an 
insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a Brady 
violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should 
have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict." (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at pp. 434-
435 [115 S.Ct. Atp. 1566], fn. Omitted.) 
Third, ''once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional 
error there is no need for fm1hcr harmless-error review." (Kyles. supra. 
514 U.S. at p. 435 [115 S.Ct. At p. 1566].) The one subsumes the other. 
(Id. at pp. 435-436 [115 S.Ct. At pp. 1566-1567].) 
Fourth, while the tendency and force of undisclosed evidence is evaluated 
item by item, its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality mut be 
considered collectively. (Id. at pp. 436-437 & fn. 10 [115 S.Ct. At p. 157]; 
see also Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112 [96 S.Ct. At p. 2402}, fn. omitted 
[omission "must be evaluated in the contest of the entire record"].) 
In Bagley, the court identified another relevant consideration in noting that 
''an incomplete response to a specific [Brac~v] request not only deprives 
the defense of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to 
the defense that the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this misleading 
representation, the defense might abandon lines of independent 
investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that it otherwise would have 
pursued." (Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 682 [105 S.Ct. At p. 3384].) 
Given this possibility, "under the ['reasonable probability'] formulation 
the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that the 
prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or 
presentation of the defendant's case. The reviewing court should assess 
the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality 
of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of 
reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the 
trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's 
incomplete response." (Id. at p. 683 [105 S.Ct. At p. 3384]; see, 
- l l -
Payne, supra, 63 F.3d at p. 1209.) 
The expert in the principle case never actually testified, because, of course, 
Schultz was not at that time aware of said expert's lack of credibility. The question is, 
what would the jury have done if there had been a trial and the expert had been cross-
examined relative to this new evidence'? In this regard, the Court in United ,)'wtes E~r Rel. 
Ordog v. Yeager, 299 F.Supp. 321, cites to Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Delli, 
352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294 (1957) ... 
"[h]ow can anyone in retrospect know ... how the jury's mind would have 
operated if powerfully improper evidence had not in effect been put in the 
scale against petitioner?" (352 U.S. 248, 77 S.Ct. 303, 1 L.Ed.2d 278) 
How can anyone reasonably ascertain upon just what evidence the jury 
relied, proper or incompetent or prejudicial, in determining their verdict? 
It is submitted that no reasonable man can answer any of these queries 111 
the affirmative. 
Likewise, how in the principle case can anyone in retrospect know how the jury's 
mind would have operated if they had known of the expert's deceitful acts in hiding his 
violation of the policies and procedures of the Idaho State lab for the last eight years? 
WHEREFORE, Schultz requests that the Court grant relief to which Schultz may 
be entitled in this proceeding, including, but not limited to, setting aside the Judgment of 
Conviction. 
(2) 'Whether or not the District Court erred in denving Schultz' 
'.\!lotion for Reconsideration. 
It is that the District Court determmed that evidence presented the 
impeachment not exculpatory "(R. pp. 217-224.) Given 
Court's finding, this Court should fully mvoke the doctrme set forth in Gardner and 
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make a <lctem1ination as to whether or not Schultz would have insisted on going to trial 
given the persuasiveness of the withheld infomrntion. 
The District Court in its Order state<l that "Impeachment evidence "is special in 
relation to thefairness ofa trial not in respect to vvhether a plea is voluntarv.'' Dunlap v. 
State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) {quoting United States v. Rui::., 536 
U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (emphasis in original). It should be noted that Dunlap goes on to 
state 
"[i]mpeachment evidence should be viewed in the same manner as 
exculpatory evidence." Id., citing United States v. Bagley, 4 73 U.S. 66 7, 
676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985); Pizzuto v. State, 
134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3<l 742, 745 (2000). 
As the District Court has previously noted, " ... the United States Constitution does 
not require the State to disclose material impeachment infonnation prior to entering a 
plea agreement with the defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, ()33, 122 
S.Ct. 2450, 2455, 2457, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002)." 
However, in State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 885 P.2d 1144 (App. 1994), the 
Court stated as follows: 
The State also contends that a defendant is entitled to assert a Bradv 
violation only if the defendant's conviction followed a trial and not if the 
defendant pleaded guilty. This argument is misplaced, for this Court has 
previously held that grounds for withdrawal of a guilty plea were shown 
where material, exculpatory evidence known to the State had been 
withheld from the defendant. 5"tate v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408, 816 P.2d 
364 (Ct.App. 1991 ).[fn6] Although the United States Supreme Court's 
decisions have articulated the prosecutor's disclosure obligation as one 
essential to ensure a fair trial, Bradv, U.S. at S.Ct. at l I 96-
1197; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2400, the underlying policy 
expressed by these opinions to uncover truth and ensure that only the 
'lty are convicted applies as well where a guilty plea was entered in 
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ignorance of material, exculpatory information possessed by the 
prosecution. In Baglev, the Supreme Court observed that the purpose of 
the Brady rule is "to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur," 
Baglev, 473 U.S. at 675, l 05 S.Ct. at 3379-3380, and in Agurs, the Court 
stated: 
[T]hough the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the 
accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be 
faithful to his client's overriding interest that "justice shall 
be done." He is the "servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." 
,/gurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11, 96 S.Ct. at 2401, quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). As to the 
risk of conviction of the innocent by guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has 
stated, "This mode of conviction is no more foolproof than full trials to the 
court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great precautions against 
unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is by 
plea or by trial." Brac~v v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 
1474, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (l 970).[fn7] In light of these pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court, we see no reason to depart from our decision in Johnson, 
which allows relief for violations of the prosecutorial obligation of 
disclosure in appropriate circumstances where the conviction was entered 
upon a guilty plea. 
The validity of a guilty plea is determined by reference to whether it was 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 
S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Brcu~v v. United States, 397 U.S. at 
748, 90 S.Ct. at 1468-1469; Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 398, 787 P.2d at 284; 
State v. Rose, 122 Idaho 555, 558, 835 P.2d 1366, 1369. This entails an 
inquiry as to whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that 
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; whether the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to 
confront adverse witnesses and to refrain from self-incrimination; and 
whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298, 787 P.2d at 284. Thus, to satisfy 
constitutional standards, a guilty plea must not only be voluntary but must 
be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences." Bnuzv v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 
1469. It also must not be a product of "misrepresentation or other 
impermissible conduct by state agents." Id., 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at 
14 73. Where misconduct by the state keeps a defendant and his attorney 
unaware of circumstances tending to negate the defendant's guilt or to 
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reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of those facts may 
not be knowing and intelligent though it is otherwise voluntary. 
Accordingly, a Bradv v. Maryland violation may \Varrant setting aside a 
guilty plea where the violation calls into question the accuracy of the 
adjudication of guilt. 
In the vast majority of cases, when defendants plead guilty they know full 
well whether they in fact committed the offense. If information withheld 
by the State relates to a fact that was within the defendant's knowledge and 
that he admitted when the plea was entered, the discovery of a Bradv 
violation ought not enable the defendant to contest that which he has 
already openly admitted. In such circumstances, a violation of the 
prosecution's obligation of disclosure does not compromise the truth or 
risk conviction of the innocent. Therefore, it is essential to detennine 
\Vhether the defendant's admissions at the plea hearing fully established his 
factual guilt. 
The inquiry into the effect of the undisclosed evidence on the plea decision 
as discussed in White is essentially the same as an assessment of the 
materiality of the evidence. The Brcu(v principle is violated only if the 
evidence withheld by the state is both exculpatory and material. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (l 985); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 
107-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2399-2402; Brw(v, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-
1197. "Materiality" for purposes of evaluating a claimed Brady violation is 
defined in Bagley: 
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A "reasonable probability" is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
682, l 05 S.Ct. at 3383. 
On a Bradv challenge to a guilty plea, the test of materiality is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that but for the state's failure to produce 
the information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but mstead 
\Vot!ld insisted on to /vfiller v. Angliker, F.2d 
1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988). This is not a subjective investigation mto what 
particular defendant and his counsel actually would have decided, but 
an objective assessment, based m part upon the persuasiveness of the 
withheld mfom1ation. Id. also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 1 
S.Ct. at 370-371. 
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Schultz would invoke the doctrine set forth in Gardner and ask the Court to 
determme whether or not there is a reasonable probability, but for the State's failure to 
produce the information, Schultz would not have entered the plea but mstead would have 
insisted on going to trial. This is an objective assessment, based in part upon the part of 
the persuasiveness of the withheld information. 
In Unired 5i'tates v. Rui::. 536 U.S. 622 (2002), the Court stated as follmvs: 
When a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair 
trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees. Boykin v. Alahama, 395 U.S. 
238, 243 ( 1969) (pleading guilty implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incnmination, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one's accusers, and the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury). Given the seriousness of the matter, the Constitution 
insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is "voluntary" and 
that the defendant must make related waivers "knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 ( 1970); see also Bovkin, supra, at 242. 
Schultz would assert that his plea of guilt was not knowing, voluntary and 
mtelligent given the persuasiveness of the withheld information. Where misconduct by 
the State keeps a defendant and his attorney unaware of circumstances tending to negate 
the defendant's guilt or to reduce his culpability, a guilty plea entered in ignorance of 
those facts may not be knowing and intelligent, though it is otherwise voluntary. 
Therefore, a Brw~y violation may warrant setting aside a guilty plea where the violation 
calls into question the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt. Gardner at 434. 
Further, Schultz specifically requests that this Court find that the evidence 
introduced is exculpatory evidence. In v. United States, the Court held that 
"'exculpatory evidence includes "evidence affecting" witness "credibility," where the 
witness' "reliability" is likely "detern1inative of guilt or innocence"". Giglio v. United 
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States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 ( 1972). Giglio filed a motion for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence contending that the Government failed to disclose an 
alleged promise of leniency made to its key witness in return for his testimony. At a 
hearing on this motion, the Assistant United States Attorney who presented the case to 
the grand jury admitted that he promised the witness that he would not be prosecuted if he 
testified before the grand jury and at trial. The Assistant who tried the case was unaware 
of the promise. The court held that the prosecution's duty to present all material evidence 
to the jury was not fulfilled and constituted a violation of due process requiring a new 
trial. Id. 
Schultz contends that the evidence presented to the District Court is, in fact, 
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. As set forth above, exculpatory 
evidence includes impeachment evidence where the witness' reliability is likely 
determinative of guilt or innocence. 
Obviously, in any possession of controlled substances case, the forensic scientist' 
testimony will determine guilt or innocence. Hypothetically speaking, upon an 
examination of the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, a defendant could meet every single 
element contained in those instructions for the charge of possession of controlled 
substances, with the exception of the determination that the substance was, in fact, a 
controlled substance, and not be guilty of the charge. [t is not sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance where the substance is not, in fact, a 
controlled substance. The only witness that can satisfy this requirement is a forensic 
scientist, duly qualified, who can reliably report test results. There can be no other 
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Therefore, £his witness' testimony is determinative o{guilt or innocense. 
f n addition, the evidence is exculpatory for several other reasons. First, according 
to Daubert v. /<.Jerrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). the 
testing procedures utilized in a criminal proceeding should be in a form that is commonly 
accepted in the scientific community. As the Court is likely aware, analysis of controlled 
substances utilizes the Scientific Method. The Scientific Method requires a "controlled" 
environment. The evidence submitted at heanng clearly shows that a large quantity of 
controlled substances which had been unaccounted was being stored in the roof tiles of 
the laboratory. Given that there were no rules or regulations pertaining to the storage of 
those drugs, nor their handling, it is entirely possible that the entire forensic laboratory 
was contaminated by the unaccounted for controlled substances. Further, the evidence 
clearly demonstrates that there were no set procedures concerning the amount of 
substance which was to be taken from each substance for testing purposes, there were no 
rules or regulations concerning the destruction of samples, nor were the forensic analysts 
being audited concerning their policies and procedures relating to the analysis of 
controlled substances. It is apparent that there was not a controlled environment existing 
at the time Schultz' drug sample was tested. The evidence introduced at hearing clearly 
demonstrates that said evidence is both impeaching and exculpatory. 
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CONCLUSION 
Schultz would request that the Court make a determination as to whether or not 
the evidence presented calls into question the accuracy of the adjudication of guilt. 
Schultz \Vould also request that this Court declare the evidence introduced at hearmg to 
be both impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. 
As was stated by Colonel G. Jerry Russell, Director, Idaho State Police. 111 
correspondence dated May 11, 2011, to Wilham Lloyd Mauk, 
"Mr. Anderson was complicit over a period of years in deliberately hiding 
a box of "show and tell" drugs kept at the ISP Forensic Lab in Pocatello. I 
understand that this was part of the training he received from now fom1er 
Region 5 lab employees, Don Wyckoff and Rockland McDowell, who 
apparently justified to him as the box being kept as "reforence" matenals 
that would cost money to order from supply companies. Mr. Anderson's 
direct participation in the activity concerning this box appears to have 
ended in 2008 when he was transferred to toxicology, at which point he 
ceased having any direct connection to it. Arter reading an article that 
Region 5 Lab Manager Shannon Larson sent to Mr. Anderson in 2011, and 
knowing that the existence of the unauthorized box could have a negative 
effect on the lab's accreditation, Mr. Anderson reported the existence of 
the box to Ms. Larson. Until this disclosure to Ms. Larson, this box and 
its contents were kept secreted and hidden from auditors. Mr. Anderson 
himself hid this box and its contents on at least four occasions, and he 
instructed at least one other lab employee to do the same. 
As set forth in the Notice of contemplated Disciplinary Action dated April 
27, 2011, there are very serious consequences of Mr. Anderson's actions 
that I must consider. First, since he deliberately hid the box of "show and 
tell" drugs from lab auditors, numerous times and over a period of years, I 
have no choice but to view his actions as repeated purposeful deception. 
Second, Mr. Anderson's actions may have caused serious damage to 
Region 5 Lab's reputation, and may have even called into question the 
accuracy and integrity of the entire lSP Forensic Lab program. Surely Mr. 
Anderson appreciates the devastation to the Idaho criminal justice system 
should that happen. Third, Mr. Anderson's actions could have an adverse 
on Region S's lab accreditation. He should be acutely aware of this, 
given that he is an ASCLD/LAB (American Society of Crime Laboratory 
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Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board) auditor. 
(Please see Exhibit "B".) It is difficult to imagine that had Schultz known of the findings 
made by the Idaho State Police, that he would have entered a plea of guilty. Schultz 
contends that he would have entered a plea of not gmlty, and would have taken the matter 
to a trial before a jury of his peers. 
Therefore, Schultz requests that his plea of guilt be withdrawn and/or set aside 
and the conviction vacated. In the alternative, Schultz requests that this Court grant him a 
new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
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